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Introduction
In principle, free trade can make everyone better off; but received theory,
from Stolper and Samuelson (1941) to Jones (1971), suggests that this is unlikely
to happen in practice.

The changes in relative goods prices that come with ex

panded trade produce changes in the distribution of income; and in the simple
models which make up the core of trade theory these changes in income distribution
invariably leave the owners of some factors of production absolutely worse off.
The implication is that trade liberalization always involves trading off gains
for some against losses for others, suggesting that moves toward freer trade will
occur only rarely and after severe political struggles.
If one looks at the historical record, however, especially in the post
war period, it begins to appear as if this is one of those unusual cases in
which theory has been too pessimistic about the consequences of laissez-faire.
The last thirty years have been marked by a great increase in trade, especially
among the industrial countries, with very few problems of adjustment.

Only in

recent years, with the growth of imports from the newly industrializing coun
tries, have the pressures for protection again become strong.

This experience

of painless growth in trade is in itself a major riddle, but it is wrapped in
the larger enigma of the pattern of trade.

Standard theory predicts trade

between countries with different factor endo'Wlllents, with countries specializing
in goods with different factor intensities.

Yet the growth in trade has largely

been among the industrial countries, which appear to be fairly similar in factor
endowment and surely have become more similar over time.

And the trade among

these countries is largely, and increasingly, two-way trade in similar products.
Thus there are three great paradoxes of international trade:

who trades with

whom, what they trade in, and why it hurts so little.

i.
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The purpose of this paper is to provide a tentative explanation of these
paradoxes, one which gives some guide to identifying situations in which expan
sion of trade will and will not pose serious problems of income distribution.
The explanation is not a new one:

it is essentially the same as that put for

ward by Balassa (1967), Grubel (1970), and Kravis (1971), among others.

What

this paper does is put the argument in terms of a formal model, a step which
may be of some help in clarifying and disseminating ideas which have been "in
the air" for some time.
Briefly, the argument runs as follows.

There are two kinds of trade:

Heckscher-Ohlin trade, which is based on differences in factor proportions,
and "intraindustry" trade, which is based on the interaction of economies of
scale with product differentiation.

Countries with similar factor endo'WI!lents

will have little incentive for engaging in Heckscher-Olin trade, but will stil!
engage in intraindustry trade,

But intraindustry trade does not have the strong

distributional effects of Heckscher-Ohlin trade.

The result is that expansion

of trade between countries with sufficiently similar factor endowments will not
pose the distributional problems which Heckscher-Ohlin theory leads us to expect,
Obviously, the crucial step in formalizing this argument is to model in
traindustry trade,

In this paper I use a simple model of intraindustry trade

which was developed in an earlier paper (Krugman 1979), and extend it to a two
industry, two-factor world,
this model's

The structure of this model and the determination of

equilibrium in a closed economy is set forth in Section 1.

Section

2 shows how the pattern of trade between two countries is determined in the model,
developing the basic relationship between differences in factor endowments and
the extent of intraindustry trade,

Section 3 then examines the effects of trade

on income distribution, and shows how the extent of intraindustry trade deter
mines whether scarce factors of production gain or lose from trade.

Finally,
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Section 4 summarizes the results and discusses some implications for theory
and policy.
It must be emphasized that the model presented here is in no sense a
general one.

In addition to making strong assumptions about functional forms

of cost and utility functions, I impose a great deal of symmetry on the model
to simplify the analysis and give a natural meaning to the concept of "similar
ity" in factor proportions.
suggestive.

Thus the results of the analysis are at best

Nonetheless, they seem intuitively plausible, and also seem to

have something to do with actual experience.
1.

The Model in a Closed Economy
Intraindustry trade depends on the existence of unexhausted economies

of scale in production.

The main problem in modelling this kind of trade is

how to handle these scale economies, which must lead to a breakdown of perfect
competition (unless they are wholly external to firms).

In this paper, as in

an earlier paper (Krugman 1979), I will use the device of Chamberlinian mono
polistic competition, basing the model on recent work by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
An "inf]ustry" will consist of a large number of firms, all producing somewhat
differentiated products, all operating on the dowuward-sloping parts

average cost curves.

There will be two-way international trade within an in

dustry, because finps in different countries will produce different differen
tiated products.

What prevents countries from producing a complete range of

products domestically is the existence of fixed costs in production; thus scale
economies are the basic cause of intraindustry trade.
Let us begin, however, with a two-industry model of a closed economy.
All of the products in each industry will enter symmetrically into demand, with
the two industries--industry 1 and industry 2--themselves playing symmetric
roles.

All individuals will have the convenient utility function
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First, it ensures that half of income will always

be spent on industry l's products, half on industry 2's products.

Second, if

the number of products in each industry is large, it implies that every pro
ducer faces a demand curve with elasticity

11 1-e.

Finally, (1) will allow

us to represent the gains and losses from trade in a particularly simple way.
On the demand side, then, an industry is assumed to consist of a number
of products which are imperfect substitutes for one another.
side, however, they will be assumed to be perfect substitutes.

On the supply
There will be

only two factors of production, type 1 labor and type 2 labor, each of which
is wholly specific to an industry but nonspecific among products within an
industry.

Thus type 1 labor will be used only in industry 1, type 2 only in

industry 2.

Within each industry the labor required to produce a particular

product will consist of a fixed set-up cost and a constant variable cost:
(2)

where

.tl,i

is labor used in producing the

is the output of that product; and so on.

i

th

product of industry 1; x 1 i

To go from these required labor

inputs to nominal costs we must multiply by the wage rates of the two types
l

of labor,

and

''
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To close the model, we begin by noting that output of each product, x,
is the sum of individual consumptions of the product.

At the same time, total

employment in each industry is the sum of employment in producing all the individual products.

Assuming full employment, we have

nl
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(3)

2-z
O<z<l

Thus the total labor force is set equal to 2, with the parameter
factor proportions.

As we will see below,

z

z

measuring

will assume crucial significance

in determining the importance of intraindustry trade and the effect of trade on
income distribution.
We are now prepared to examine the determination of equilibrium in this
model.

This involves determining how many products are actually produced in

each industry, the output of each product, the prices of products, and the
relative wages of the two

kinds of labor.

We should note at the outset that

it is indeterminate wh~ch products are produced--but it is also unimportant.
Our first step is to determine the pricing policy of firms.
that producers can always costlessly differentiate their products.
that each product will be produced by only one firm.

We assume
This means

If there are many products

the elasticity of demand for each product will, as already noted, be 1/1-0.
(This is proved in the Appendix).
constant elasticity,

Thus each firm will face a demand curve of

We then have the familiar result that the profit-maximizing

price will be marginal cost plus a constant percentage makeup:
(4)

6

are the prices of any products in industry 1 and 2 respectively

where

which are actually produced.
Given the pricing policy of firms, actual profits depend on sales:
(5)

are sales of representative firms in the two industries.

where

But in this model there will be free entry of firms, driving each industry to Chamberlin's "tangency solution" where profits are zero.

Thus we

can use the condition of zero profits in equilibrium to determine the equilib
rium size and number of firms.

Setting

n

1

E

n

2

= O, and using (4) and (5),

we have
( 6)

for the size of firms.

The number of firms can then be determined from the

full-employment condition:
(7)

The final step in determining equilibrium is to determine relative wages.
This can be done very simply by noting that the industries receive equal shares
of expenditure, and that since profits are zero in equilibrium thes.e receipts
go entirely to the wages of the industry-specific labor forces.

So

w1L1 =

w L , implying
2 2
(8)

7

We now have a completely worked-out equilibrium for a two-sector, mono
polistically competitive economy.

It is indeterminate which of the range of

potential products within each industry are actually produced, but since all
products appear symmetrically, this is of no welfare significance.
of the economy is determined by the two parameters
determines relative wages:

if

z

8.

The value of

z

8 measures the degree of substituta

bility among products within an industry.
of the importance of scale economies.
But

and

is low, type 2 labor will receive much higher

The value of

wages than type 1 labor.

z

The character

It is also, in equilibrium, a measure

From (4) we have

8

c

8w /p • 8w 2 /p 2 •
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are the marginal costs of production, while in equilibrium price

8w , ew 2
1

equals average cost.

Thus

8

is the ratio of marginal to average cost (which

is also the elasticity of cost with respect to output).
2.

Factor Proportions and the Pattern of Trade
In the last section we saw how equilibrium can be determined in a simple

closed-economy model with scale economies and differentiated products.
now examine what happens when two such economies trade.

We can

What we are principally

concerned with is the proposition, advanced in the introduction, that countries
with similar factor endowments will engage in "intraindustry;; trade, while
countries with very different endowments will engage in Heckscher-Ohlin trade.
As a first step we need a working measure of the extent of intraindustry
trade.

The empirical literature on intraindustry trade (e.g., Hufbauer and

Chilas 1974, Grubel and Lloyd 1975) generally concentrates on an index of trade
overlap, i.e.,

tlx -MI
I • l

_ __k_
_ _k__k
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k
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K
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where

~

is ,a country's exports in industry

~

k,

is imports in that in

This index has the property that if trade is balanced industry by

dustry.

industry, it equals one, while if there is complete international specializa
tion, so that every industry is either an export or import industry, it equals
zero.

As we will see, this index fits in quite well with the model of this

paper.
The other concept we need to tie down is that of "similarity" in factor
What I will do in this paper,

In general this is not well defined.

endowments.

however, is to consider a special case in which the concept does have a natural
meaning, without trying to arrive at a general definition.
Let us suppose, then, that there are two countries, the home country
and the foreign country.
1.

The home country will be just as described in Section

The foreign country will be identical, except for one thing:

the relative

sizes of the two industries' labor forces will be reversed.

That is, the

foreign country will be a mirror image of the home country.

If we use a star

on a variable to indicate that it refers to the foreign country, we have
Ll = 2-z

*

Ll

,c:

12

Lz*

z

a::

z

=

2-z

(10)

Obviously, given this pattern of endowments we can regard
index of similarity in factor proportions.
tical endowments,

As

z

If

z

E

z

as an

1, the countries have iden

gets smaller, the factor proportions become increas-

ingly different.
Now suppose these countries are able to trade, at zero transportation
cost.

As before, we can determine pricing behavior, the size and number of

firms, and relative wages.
of trade.

In addition, we can determine the volume of pattern
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The first point to note is that the elasticity of demand for any par
ticular product is still

1/1-e.

This gives us price equations exactly the

same as before:

pl

- e

-1

P2 =

e-1

Sw 2

pl*

e-1

Sw *
1

* • e-1

Sw *
2

D

P2

(11)

Sw1

Now, however, the symmetry of the setup insures that all wages will be
equal, both across industries and internation ally:
(12)

The zero-profit condition will determine the equilibrium size of firm,

x, which will be the same for both industries in both countries:
(13)

x = ae/S(l-e)

Finally, full-employm ent determines the number of firms in each industry
in each country:
(14)

What these results show is that trade will lead to factor price equali
zation, while leaving the pattern of production unchanged.
is to determine the volume and pattern of trade.
points.

Our remaining task

We can do this by noting two

First, everyone will devote equal shares of expenditure to the two

industries.

Second, everyone will spend an equal amount on each of the products
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within an industry.

This means that the share of all individuals' income

falling on, say, industry 1 products produced in the foreign country is

1

2

*
nl
•--*---that is, the industry share in expenditure times that country's
nl+nl

share of the industry.
labor force.

But the number of products is proportional to the

Thus if we let

foreign country's),
industry 2 products,

x1
M
1

Y be the home country's income, (equal to the

be exports of industry 1 products,

x2

be imports of industry 1 products, and

be exports of
M2

be imports

of industry 2 products, we have
1
Xl = -2 y • (2-z/2)

(15)

1
• (z/2)
x2 ""-Y
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• (z/2
Ml = -Y
2
M

2
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Now the relations (15) have two important implications.
the volume of trade,

Total home country exports are

the ratio of trade to income is independent of
factor proportions.

First, consider
Thus

z, the index of similarity in

This can be regarded as an answer to the first empirical

paradox mentioned in the introduction, the large volume of trade among similar
countries.

In this model similar countries will trade just as much as dissimilar

countries.
The second empirical paradox was the prevalence, in trade among similar
countries, of two-way trade in similar products.

If we substitute (15) into

our expression for intraindustry trade (9), we get a simple, striking result:

I • z

(16)
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Th!_ index

2f. intraindustry trade equals the index of similarity

in factor

progortions.
This still leaves us with the third empirical paradox, which was that
expansion of trade, when it involves largely intraindustry trade, seems to in
volve few problems of income distribution.

To see how this can be understood

is the task of the next section.
3.

Gains and Losses from Trade
In this section we must again begin by tying down a concept which I

have been using loosely.
problems.

This is the idea of the "seriousness" of distribution

'What we need is a clear way of formulating the notion that distri

bution problems from opening trade will not be serious if countries are suf
ficiently similar in factor proportions, so that the trade which results is
primarily intraindustry trade.
The criterion I will
the following:

U!lle

to define nonserious distribution problems is

distribution problems arising from trade will be held not to

be serious if both factors gain from trade.

This of course begs some questions,

since there may be difficulties in getting groups to accept a relative decline
in income even if they are absolutely better off,

But this criterion is fairly

reasonable, and turns out to give suggestive results.
To find out whether factors gain from trade, we need to know how utility
depends on the variables of the model.

w, and has the utility function (1).

Suppose an individual receives a wage
He will then spend

w/2

on the products

of each industry, and divide lis expenditure equally among the products within
an industry.

Thus his utility will depend on his wage, the prices of represen

tative products in each industry, and the number of products available:
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(17)

• - 2tn 2 + tn w/p 1 + in w/p 2
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+~
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e
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The function (17) has the convenient property that all the effects enter
additively.

Utility depends on real wages in terms of representative products

and on diversity.
To analyze the effects of trade on welfare, it is useful to introduce
some more notation.
• utility of workers in industry 1, 2
• real wage of industry 1 workers in terms of products of
industries 1 and 2
s

real wage of industry 2 workers in terms of products of
industries 1 and 2

Then we can substitute into (17) to get (suppressing the constant term)
Ul • .2.n wll + in w12 +

1-e

0

(18)

tn nl

+ 1-8 in n2
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We are now in a position to measure the welfare effects of trade.

Sup

pose we start from a position of autarky, as in Section 1, then move to free
trade, as in Section 2.

There will then be two kinds of effects.

First, there

will be a "Stolper-Samuelson" effect as factor prices are equalized.

As one

can easily verify, labor's real wage remains the same in terms of the products
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of its own industry, while rising or falling in terms of the other industry's
products depending on whether the factor is abundant or scarce.

Thus in the

home country this effect benefits labor in industry 1, hurts labor in industry

2.
The second effect comes from the increase in the size of the market,
which makes a greater variety of products available.

This works to everyone's

benefit.
Since both effects work in its favor, the abundant factor must be made
better off.

This leaves us with the problem of determining the change in

utility of the scarce factor--industry 2 labor in the home country, and the
symmetrically placed industry 1 labor in the foreign country.
Let a prime on a variable indicate its free trade value, while unmarked
variables refer to autarky.

Then as we move from the autarky solution in

Section 1 to the free trade solution in Section 2 the change in

'
+
u2' - u2 sin Wz1lw21

• .tn z/2-z +

u2 is
(19)

0

,

..1.-0

e

tn 2/2-z

- tn 2/z
+ -1-e
8

where the first term is negative, and represents the Stolper-Samuelson distri
bution loss; and the remaining terms are positive, and represent the gains
from being part of a larger market.

The question is under what conditions

these terms will outweigh the first term.
By collecting terms, we can rewrite (19) as

14
2 29
1
29-1
'
2
in z u 2 - u 2 .. - 96 in 2-z + T i n
This gives us one immediate result:

if

(20)

9< 0.5, the scarce factor

necessarily gains from trade, since the first term will be positive and the
Recall that

third term will outweigh the second.

9

is, in equilibrium , the

ratio of marginal to average cost, and can thus be regarded as an index of the
importance of economies of scale.

What this result then says is that if scale

economie s~ sufficiently important, both factors gain from trade.
9> 0.5, whether both factors gain depends on the extent to which

If

trade is intraindust ry in character, which in turn depends on how similar the

properties:

9> 0.5, the function (20) has three

When

countries are in factor proportions .

2-29
9

z

approaches 1,

u2 - u 2

goes to

(ii) as

z

goes to zero,

u2 - u2

goes to minus infinity;

(iii) u2 - u2 is strictly increasing in

zl.

Thus if we were to-graph (20), it would look like Fig1.1:re 1.
value of
z < z

z, z,

for which

u2 - u 2

the scarce factor loses.

proportions .

tn 2 >O;

(i) as

But

=

O.
z

If

z > z

There is a critical

both factors gain; if

is our measure of similarity in factor

Thus what we have shown is that if countries have sufficientl y

similar factor endowwents, both

What is particularl y'nice about this result is that we have already seen
that there is a one-for-one relationshi p between similarity of factor endowments
and intraindust ry trade.

So this result can be taken as a vindication of the

arguments of such authors as Kravis (1971) and Hufbauer and Chilas (1974) that
intraindust ry trade poses fewer adjustment problems than Heckscher-O hlin trade.
We should note, however, that the critical value of intraindust ry trade
depends on the importance of scale economies. The function (20) is decreasing
-2
I
1n z(2-z) <O. So an increase in 9 will shift the
in 9: a(u 2 - u 2)/a9 • 9
function down. As illustrated in Figure 2, this will increase z. The less
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important
factors

scale economies, the

~

~

~

similar countries must be if both

to gain from trade.

We can actually calculate

z-

for selected values of

e,

to illustrate

the point:

e

z

0.6
0. 7
0. 8
0.9

.490
•69 2
•825
.923

In the limit, as

6

goes to 1, so does

-z.

What this says is that a

world in which scale economies are unimportant is a Heckscher-Ohlin world to
which the Stolper-Samuels on theorem applies.

But in this model this is only a

limiting case.
4.

Summary and Conclusions
This paper began with three "paradoxes" about international trade.

Since they do not seem so paradoxical in the light of this model, perhaps we
should state them as "stylized facts":
(i)
(ii)

Much of world trade is between countries with similar factor endowments;
The trade between similar countries is largely "intraindustry" in charac
ter, i.e., it consists of two-way trade in similar products;

(iii)

The growth of intraindustry trade has not posed serious income distribu
tion problems.
The model developed in this paper, which combines factor proportions

theory with what is sometimes called "scale economies with differentiated prod
ucts" theory, provides a simple-perhaps too simple--explana tion of these styl
ized facts.

In this model, countries with similar factor proportions will

trade just as much as countries with dissimilar factor proportions.

Intrain

dustry trade and similarity of factor proportions are directly related.

And
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trade between sufficien tly similar countries will benefit scarce as well as
abundant factors.
In addition to helping make sense of some puzzling empirical results,
this paper is, I hope, of some interest from the standpoin t of pure theory.
The model dispenses with the two most fundament al assumptio ns of standard
trade theory:

perfect competiti on and constant returns to scale.

Instead,

I have dealt in this paper with a world in which economies of scale are perva
sive and all firms have monopoly power.

While the model depends on extremely

restrictiv e assumptio ns, it does show that it is possible for trade theory to
make at least some progress into this virtually unexplore d territory .
Finally, the model appears to have some policy relevance .

For it pro

vides some theoretic al justifica tion for the commonly made argument that trade
in manufactu red goods poses less of a problem if it takes place between devel
oped countries than if it takes place between developed and less-deve loped
countries .

What this suggests is that it may have been economic forces as

much as political wisdom which made possible the great postwar liberaliz ation
of trade among the industria l countries .

These same economic forces are now,

unfortuna tely, working to block the growth of exports from today's newly in
dustriali zing countries .

Elasticity of Demand for Individual Products

Appendix:

The analysis in Section 1 depends on the result that the elasticity of
demand for any particular product is

1/1-0.

This appendix gives a demonstra

tion of this.
Consider an individual maximizing his utility function (1) subject to
a budget constraint.

The first-order conditions from that maximization will

have the form

pl , i -=

cl i
).

-(1-0)
0

I: cl k

k

,

-(1-0)
P2,j ,..

c2zj
).

e

I: c2 ,m

m
where

).

is the shadow price on the budget constraint, i.e., the marginal

utility of income,
If there are many products, however, the firm producing a particular
product can take the denominators of these expressions as given.
indivirlu~l'~ rlem~nd fnT

will have elasticity

~

Thus each

parti~ular product, and therefore also market demand,

1/1-0.
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